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There have been a lot of studies performed on secure group communication over
unsecured channels such as the Internet and Ad Hoc network. Most of the results
are focused on cryptographic methods to share secret keys within the group. In the
real world, however, we cannot establish an application for group communication
without considering authentication of each peer (group member) since the adversary
could digitally disguise itself and intrude into the key sharing process without valid
membership. Therefore, authentication is an inevitable component for any other
secure communication protocols as well as peer group communication.
On the classical design of group key protocols, each peer should be authenticated
by a separate and centralized authentication server (e.g. Kerberos). Although many
practical protocols present efficient ways for authentication, we are still facing the
necessity of optimization between authentication and group key distribution. In
that sense, implicit key authentication is an ideal property for group key protocols
since, once it is possibly put into practice, we don’t need any separate authentication
procedure as a requisite.
There was an attempt to devise implicit key authentication service in conjunc-
tion with group key protocol; Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman (A-GDH) and its
stronger version (SA-GDH). Unfortunately, both were proved to have some weak-
ness from the man-in-the-middle attack. In the forthcoming project, fixes for A-
GDH and SA-GDH using a Message Authentication Code (MAC) scheme will be
proposed and performance evaluation will be carried out from implementation and
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Since 2-party Diffie-Hellman key exchange was first proposed in 1976 [3], its contributory
nature has attracted many cryptographers into trying to extend it to a group setting.
Among those efforts, Group Diffie-Hellman (GDH) in [8] is thought as one of the suc-
cessful extensions of Diffie-Hellman to the n-party case. There are several versions of
GDH, among which GDH.2 and GDH.3 are considered as practical group protocols (see
the details in [8]). Nevertheless, GDH cannot stand alone, as other group key distrib-
ution protocols, since authentication of each peer (group member) should precede the
group key sharing procedure in a practical application. Although there are useful au-
thentication techniques for group communication protocols, most of them depend upon a
centralized server, trusted third party. This not only increases communication costs but
also deteriorates security of the protocol.
Implicit Key Authentication, which will be discussed in the next section, is an ideal
property for secure group communication since it gets rid of the need for a separate
authentication machanism during key sharing. In [1] and [2], Ateniese et al. proposed
authenticated versions of GDH, which include Implicit Key Authentication; Authenticated
GDH.2 (A-GDH.2) and Strong Authenticated GDH.2 (SA-GDH.2). Several years after
A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 were proposed, Pereira et al. [7] proved that the authenticated
versions of GDH still have the weakness from man-in-the-middle attack (2-party Diffie-
Hellman has the same flaw).
In this project, I will propose fixes for A-GDH and SA-GDH using a Message Authenti-
cation Code (MAC) scheme, which will protect the messages exchanged from adversary’s
forgery. Among the practical MAC protocols, which are all on the trade-off between
efficiency and reliability, I will mainly consider efficiency of the protocol since group com-
munication is usually performed synchronously and whatever the adversary does should
be executed in relatively tiny time. Finally, there will be performance evaluation from
implementation and experimentation for each; A-GDH, SA-GDH, A-GDH with MAC,
and SA-GDH with MAC.
2 Notation and Properties
In this section, I will present the notation which will be used in the forthcoming project
and discuss the properties of authenticated GDH protocols.
2.1 Notation for Authenticated GDH protocols
The notation which will be used in this project is mostly taken from [1] and [2], and
all arithmetic operations are performed in a cyclic group G of prime order q which is a
subgroup of Z∗p for a prime p such that p = kq + 1 for some small k ∈ N (e.g. k = 2 ).
The notation used in this project is shown in Table 1.
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n Number of group members
i, j Indices of group members
Mi i-th group member; i ∈ [1, n]
p, q p, q prime, q | φ(p)
G Unique subgroup of Z∗p of order q
α Exponentiation base; generator of G
xi Long-term secret key of Mi
ri Mi’s secret exponent (nounce) ∈ Zq
Sn Group key shared among n memebers
Sn(Mi) Mi’s view on a group key
Kij Long-term secret shared by Mi and Mj
F () A function from G to Zq
Iij Intermediate value computed by Mi for Mj
Table 1: Notation
2.2 Properties of Authenticated GDH protocols
A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 support commonly desired properties for group key distribu-
tion protocols; Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS), Resistance to Known-Key Attacks, Key
Authentication, and so on. [1] and [2] present the definitions of these properties and the
proofs that our protocols satisfy those. In addition, A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 possess
characteristics as the following:
• Key Agreement protocol
• Contributory protocol
• Provide Implicit Key authentication
The characteristics above distinguish authenticated versions of GDH from other group
key distribution protocols. The definitions for the above are given below. (These are
adapted from [1] or [2])
Definition 1 A key agreement protocol is a key establishment technique whereby a
shared secret key is derived by two or more specified parties as a function of information
contirbuted by, or associated with, each of these, such that no party can predetermine the
resulting value.
Definition 2 A key agreement protocol is contirbutory if each party equally contributes
to the key and guarantees its freshness.
We can see that the basic two-party Diffie-Hellman is a contributory as well as a key
agreement protocol. However, A-GDH and SA-GDH may have a contraversy in their
contributory property according to what the word equally means. Practically in group
protocols, the meaning of equally is regarded as contributing each member’s public key
to the key distribution process in an even way.
4
Definition 3 Let R be an n-party key agreement protocol, M be the set of protocol parties
and let Sn be a secret key jointly generated as a result of R. We say that R provides
implicit key authentication if each Mi ∈ M is assured that no party Mq /∈ M can
learn the key Sn unless aided by a dishonest Mj ∈M.
[1] and [2] present the proof that A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 provide implicit key au-
thentication. As mentioned above, this property removes the need for a separate authen-
tication process.
3 Authenticated Group Diffie-Hellman protocols
In this section, I will discuss A-GDH.2, SA-GDH.2, the attacks on them, and the fixed
using MAC. The discussion will be mainly on Initial Key Agreement1 operations since this
project is focused on the authentication when the group communication is initiated. Note
that authentication during member joining or group merging depends on the policies,
related to the problem of who authenticate(s) whom. The detail cases under topological
changes of dynamic group are given in [9].
3.1 A-GDH.2 protocol
A-GDH.2 is an authenticated version of GDH.2. The protocol description of A-GDH.2 is
given in [1] and [2].
As we see, the upflow stage (i.e. the protocol rounds from M1 to Mn−1) is identical to
GDH.2. The only difference is that, on the broadcast stage, the group controller (the last
member Mn) sends the intermediate value Ini to each member Mi (i ∈ [1, n− 1]), hiding
with the long-term secret key between Mi and Mn, Kin = F (α
xixn(mod q)). Since xi and
xn refer to the long-term secret keys of Mi and Mn, Kin can be computed only by Mi and
Mn. The problem to find α
ab from given αa and αb is known as a computational Diffie-
Hellman problem2. The last round of this protocol guarantees that no one without an




·Kin from the group controller Mn. Mi can compute the group key Sn = αr1···rn only
if Mi can compute K
−1
in where Kin ·K−1in = 1(mod q). Therefore, MI /∈ G disguised as Mi
cannot compute the group key without knowing xi, the long-term secret key of Mi. This
satisfies the property of implicit key authentication.
However, A-GDH.2 is a relatively weak form of implicit key authentication since the
authentication is performed only between Mi and Mn, i ∈ [1, n − 1]. An example of
A-GDH.2 with four parties is given in Figure 1. If we take a snapshot in the view of
M3, we can see that M3 receives the sequence of intermediate values {αr2 , αr1 , αr1r2} =
{I21, I22, I23} from M2 and sends {αr2r3 , αr1r3 , αr1r2 , αr1r2r3} = {I31, I32, I33, I34} to M4.
1Initial key agreement refers to the very first group key agreement. This operation takes place at the
time of group genesis. In the meanwhile, Auxiliary Key Agreement refers to all subsequent key agreement
operations through membership changes after the initial group key is once established. (See the details
in [9])
2It is known that a computational Diffie-Hellman problem is very hard to solve since there is no
efficient way to find the solution [10]. The group protocols based on Diffie-Hellman rely on this hardness.
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to each member Mi.
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{α, αr1} M2 -
{αr2 , αr1 , αr1r2} M3
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Figure 1: An example of A-GDH.2 with 4 members
3.2 SA-GDH.2 protocol
As mentioned above, A-GDH.2 is not strong enough in a certain situation since authen-
ticating function is centralized to the last member (group controller). In order to provide
stronger authentication service, Ateniese et al also designed SA-GDH.2 in which every
member authenticates the other members (see [1] and [2] for the protocol details).
Unlike A-GDH.2, SA-GDH.2 requires each intermediate value3 for Mi, given by Mk,
to be computed by using Kki (0 < i 6= k ≤ n) from the upflow stage as well so that each
member can not only equally contribute to authentication but also be explicitly aware
of the exact group membership when the protocol is initiated. Another advatage of SA-
GDH.2 over A-GDH.2 is that each member performs the same sequence of computational
steps and the same number of exponentiations. An example of SA-GDH.2 with four
members is given in Figure 2. Obviously, SA-GDH.2 is more expensive in computation of
intermediate values than A-GDH.2.
Although SA-GDH.2 has higher cost of exponentiation than A-GDH.2, if the group
settings (e.g. group membership, communication order of each member, etc) are deter-
mined in advance of the protocol’s beginning (this seems to be a common situation in
group communication), the computational costs can be mostly saved by pre-computation.
3In SA-GDH.2 protocol, different number of intermediate values computed by Mi are sent to the next
member Mi+1. For example, Mi+1 in SA-GDH.2 receives from Mi a sequence of intermediate values
{Ii1, Ii2, . . . Iin}, instead of {Ii1, Ii2, . . . Ii(i+1)} in A-GDH.2.
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M1 -
{α, αr1K12 , αr1K13 , αr1K14} M2 -
{αr2K21 , αr1K12 , αr1r2K13K23 ,
αr1r2K14K24} M3
?


























































Figure 2: An example of SA-GDH.2 with 4 members




Eij if i 6= j
I(i−1)j if i = j
(1)
Eij = ri ·Kij (mod q) (2)
As you can see in (2), the exponential value Eij can be pre-computed at the preliminary
stage of key agreement protocol. Therefore, we can minimize the additional computation
on SA-GDH.2 in a practical way.
3.3 Attacks on authenticated GDH protocols
Pereira et al. provide security analyses on authenticated GDH protocols. First, they
tried to find security holes of A-GDH.2 in conjuction with the major secure properties in
[5]: Implicit Key Authentication, Perfect Forward Secrecy, and Resistance to known-keys
attacks. However, their attacks have some impractical conditions on the intruder’s ability
which includes the followings:
• An intruder can eavesdrop the intended message sent by any participant in the
current group session.
• An intruder can immediately forge the intended message sent by any participant
without being detected.
Although both conditions above seems to be more infeasible as group communication
gets bigger in the size and more dynamic with the membership, this shows the relative
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vulnerability of A-GDH.2. The similar technique and condition can be applied to attack
SA-GDH.2 (See the details in [6]). The effect from the attack on SA-GDH.2 is more
limited than on A-GDH.2. However, SA-GDH.2 still has flaws on its security as a group
communication protocol. Finally, Pereira et al. proposed the proof on the generic inse-
curity of authenticated GDH protocols in 2004 [7]. They proved that it is impossible to
design a scalable authenticated group key agreement protocol based on the same building
blocks as the authenticated GDH ones under the conditions on the intruders described
above.
One of the solutions given by Pereira et al. in the conclusion of [7] is the use of message
authentication codes (MAC) which prevents the intruders from forging messages. They
thought this separates the key generation part of the protocol from the authentication
mechanisms. However, I think that we should not necessarily separate those two parts
and that we can design an authenticated GDH protocol with implicit key authentication
using MAC, which has slightly heavier computation than the original design of A-GDH
and SA-GDH.
3.4 Fixes for A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2 using a MAC
Against the active adversary who can forge messages in the network, MAC has been
proved to be a reliable technique and widely used in the real world. For example, Secure
Socket Layer (SSL) protocol, a standard of a secure protocol supported by many web
browsers, uses message authentication codes (MAC) in order to authenticate both the
source of a message and its integrity wihout the use of any additional mechanisms.
Among many MAC protocols being used in communication applications, the Keyed-
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is a cryptographic standard adopted by
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and proven to be secure as long
as the underlying hash function4 has some reasonable cryptographic strengths.
HMACs require two functionally distinct parameters, a message input and a secret key5
known only to the message sender and intended recipient. Since the authenticated GDH
protocols, both A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.2, have a secret key Kik shared between Mi and
Mk, we can design the fix with MAC without any separate authentication mechanisms.
The fixes with MAC are shown in Figure 3. Note that Iik is the intermediate value for
Mk computed by Mi and that the sequence of intermediate values in the up-flow stages
(the rounds from 1 to n − 1) is different between A-GDH.2 and SA-GDH.26. Finally,
each member can verify the intermediate values with MAC tags. If the MAC tags are not
valid, the receiver may request the sender (the former member in the protocol sequence)
to send the message again.
The length of MAC tag is not fixed in the HMAC algorithm. Since this project
is focused on the computational efficiency, the minimum security level is enough here.
According to [4], the length of the tag, t, shall be at least L
2
bytes where L is the block
4SHA1 and MD5 have become standard hash functions for many cryptographic applications.
5In order that HMAC should work, the message sender and the receiver must share a pre-arranged
secret key. See the details in [4].
6In the case with four members, for example, the third member M3 receives {I21, I22, I23} in A-GDH.2
and {I21, I22, I23, I24} in SA-GDH.2.
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Upflow steps: round i (i ∈ [1, n− 1])
Mi Mi+1
-
A-GDH.2 : { (Iik,MAC(Iik)) | k ∈ [1, i + 1] }
SA-GDH.2 : { (Iik,MAC(Iik)) | k ∈ [1, n] }




Figure 3: Using MAC in authenticated GDH protocols
size of the output of the hash function7. Therefore, we can take L
2
as t. Even though the
intruder attempts birthday attack, a well-known method to attack MAC, the synchronous
nature8 of group communication hinders him (or her) from carrying out his (or her) plan
or the attack is easily detected by MAC.
4 Deliverables
The goal of this project is to probe how practical the authenticated versions of GDH
and their fixes with MAC are. Therefore, the forthcoming project should include the
followings:
• Project Report
Theoretical review on the work of authenticated GDH protocols, HMAC, and related
studies .
Defining the authentication policy (who authenticate(s) whom) for member join-
ing/leaving and group merging/disjoing, and then designing an authenticated pro-
tocol for dynamic group membership extended from authenticated GDH.
• Experiment
Experiments for computaitional performance evaluation of A-GDH.2, SA-GDH.2,
A-GDH.2 with HMAC, and SA-GDH.2 with HMAC, in the initial key agreement
process. When the group communication commences with arbitrary number of
members, those protocols have different complexity of computations. I expect to
7 L
2 ≤ t ≤ L
8Authenticated GDH protocols also support asynchronous communication. In this case, however, the
implicit key authentication service is not as useful as in the synchronous communication since we can
take the classical design (separate authentication mechanism) without implicit key authentication.
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show how badly or gradually those compuations degrade as each protocol is tested
in order of low computation.
• Source Code
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